In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), timing information is easily available due to the use of a shared medium, even when the traffic is encrypted. This paper addresses how such timing information can be used for detecting packet forwarding activities in MANETs.
INTRODUCTION
Timing information of a node in a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is easily available to other nodes in its transmission range, even in the case of encrypted traffic. Both detection systems and network intruders can acquire the timing information and make use of it as needed. Especially, this paper addresses how timing information can be used for detecting packet forwarding between a pair of nodes.
Our objective is to detect whether there exists packet forward ing between a pair of nodes Rl and R2. We assume that end-to-end delays are uniformly bounded above by a positive real number �. This assumption is valid if the MANET is carrying packets of a real time application (e.g., audio/video streaming or Voice over IP (VoIP) application). Our detector is supposed to observe only the transmis sion epochs of each node, so that it is applicable to encrypted traffic. In practice, a node can multiplex different traffic in its transmissions, and it can also introduce dummy transmissions to confuse a detection system. Hence, even when there exists packet forwarding between Rl and R2, some transmission epochs of the nodes might not belong to the packet forwarding, and such epochs are referred to as chaff.
As illustrated in Fig. I , adversary nodes may compromise some nodes in a MANET and use them to acquire useful information or spread harmful information to innocent nodes. Then, our detection algorithm can single out the compromised nodes by detecting packet forwarding between them and adversaries. On the other hand, the al gorithm can be employed by adversaries to gather preliminary infor mation before launching attacks.
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Related Work
This work was motivated by a series of papers about the detection of unidirectional information flows, which has been studied in the con text of the stepping-stone detection [2] . Especially, to deal with en crypted traffic, timing characteristics are used in detection. Donoho et al. [3] employed a flow model with a maximum delay constraint, and proposed a multiscale analysis for detection. Chaff noise was briefly mentioned with the claim that flows can be detected if the chaff noise is independent of flows. Zhang et al. [4] also proposed a timing-based detection of flows with bounded delay and dealt with the insertion of independent chaff, but they assumed that only one node can insert chaff transmissions.
The problem becomes more challenging if the nodes are allowed to insert chaff in an arbitrary way to hide flows. Blum et al. [5] pro posed a counting-based detector and modified their detector to deal with arbitrary chaff insertion, but it can handle only a limited num ber of chaff epochs. For arbitrary chaff insertion, [6] first presented a timing-based detector that can perform consistent detection even if the amount of chaff grows linearly with the traffic size, and every node can insert chaff epochs. Moreover, it is shown in [I] that there exists a threshold on the fraction of chaff below which consistent detection is guaranteed by a single detector and beyond which the flows can be completely hidden.
Although there have been successful studies about detection of unidirectional flows, most of them excluded the possibility of bidi rectional communication which is quite common in MANETs. Hence, those results are not directly applicable to the detection of packet forwarding. To our best knowledge, this is the first attempt to detect packet forwarding in MANETs based on timing information.
Summary of Results and Organization
First, we show that the unidirectional flow detector proposed in [I] is consistent regardless of the fraction of chaff if the chaff portion of two nodes are independent Poisson processes. Furthermore, the false alarm probability decays exponentially fast as the sample size grows. Donoho et al. [3] also claimed the detectability of flows under the independent chaff assumption. However, their multiscale analysis is difficult to be applied on a real-time basis. In contrast, our detector can operate on a real-time basis, and the behavior of error probabili ties is well analyzed under the Poisson assumption. Secondly, we present a threshold-based detection algorithm for packet forwarding detection. There exists a duality between packet forwarding and unidirectional flows. Based on the duality, we con clude that the packet forwarding detector has the same performance characteristics with the unidirectional flow detector. For arbitrary chaff insertion, there exists a phase transition in detectability with respect to the fraction of chaff. And, if the chaff portions of two nodes are independent Poisson processes, then packet forwarding can be detected consistently regardless of the fraction of chaff.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro duces the notations and mathematical models employed in this paper. In section 3, we study the unidirectional flow detection under inde pendent chaff assumption, and present numerical results. Section 4 introduces the packet forwarding detection problem and proposes a detection scheme and its performance analysis. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper with remarks on its contributions.
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
We model the transmission epochs of each node as a point process. Uppercase bold letters (e.g. , S) denote point processes, and lower case bold letters (e.g. , 8) denote their realizations. For a point process S, S( i) denotes the ith transmission epoch and s( i) denotes its real ization. Given realizations of two point processes, (aI , a2, ... ) and (b1, b2, ... ), E9 is the superposition operator defined as (ak)f=l EI1 (bk)f=l = (ck)f=1 ,where c1 ::; C2::; ... and{ak}f=lU{bk}f=l = {Ck} f=l' And, given a realization 8, we use S to denote a set of all epochs in 8. An information flow with a maximum delay constraint Do can be formally defined as follows [1] . The bijection condition means packet conservation, and g( s) -s E [0, Dol implies causality and the delay bound Do.
DETECTION OF UNIDIRECTIONAL FLOWS

Problem Statement
Let Sl and S2 denote the transmission processes of R1 and R2, respectively. By observing Sl and S2 for some time t (t > 0), we want to test the following hypotheses:
Ho: HI :
Sl and S2 are jointly independent (Sl, S2) contains an information flow (1) (Sl, S2) is defined to contain an information flow if (Si)�=l can be partitioned into an information flow (Fi)�=l and a chaff part (Wi)�=l' Note that this hypothesis testing is applicable only if there can exist a flow in only one direction and the direction is known priorly, and such conditions are unrealistic in MANETs. However, the analysis given in this section takes an important role in solving the packet forwarding detection problem in section 4.
Fundamental Limit of Timing-based Detection
Using timing information alone imposes a limit in detecting unidrec tional flows under the presence of chaff. Because, intuitively, any realizations of independent processes Sl and S2 can be decomposed into a flow part and a chaff part if the rate of the information flow is sufficiently low. Hence, for an information flow to be detected, the strength of the flow needs to be strong enough. Under HI , the strength of a flow can be measured by chaff-to-traffic ratio (CTR) defined as follows. 
To evaluate the performance of detection algorithms, we borrow the following notion of Chernoff-consistent detection [7] . if it is Chernoff-consistent for all the information flows with CTR bounded almost surely by r. In other words. the false alarm proba bility PF (Ot) and the miss probability PM (Ot) satisfy the following:
8Up lim PM(Ot) = 0. where 
Given the realizations 81 and 82, the test statistic CTR(t) is cal culated by the following optimization 2
where 8i = fi EI1 Wi rv HI stands for the constraint that (f1 ' f2) is a realization of an information flow with a delay bound Do.
In 
Based on theorem 3.1, the following theorem states the consis tency of DBD under arbitrary chaff insertion. In addition. the false alarm probability decays exponenentially fast as the sample size grows.
On the other hand, if the fraction of chaff is allowed to be greater than 70, then the nodes can hide flows by mimicking 1t0 based on the schedule found by BGM.
Detectability under Independent Chaff Assumption
In this section, under the assumption that chaff portions of two nodes can be modeled as independent Poisson processes, we show that DBD is able to detect flows regardless of how high the fraction of chaff is. The first step of the proof is to calculate an upper bound of lim sup CTR(t) under 1t1 as follows. inequality with probability one.
Proof N(t), N/(t), and N c (t) are random variables denoting the true number of total epochs, information flow epochs, and chaff epochs in (8i)�=1 until time t. In addition, C(t) is a random vari able denoting the number of chaff epochs found by running BGM over (8i)�=1 until time t. Because (8i)�=1 contains an information flow, it is a superposition of the flow part (Fi)�=l and the chaff part (Wi)�=l' By the assumptions of the theorem, WI and W2 are in dependent Poisson processes with the rates ),1 -),/ and ),2 -)'/' respectively.
Consider runningBGM on (Fi)�=l and (Wi)�=l separately un til time t, and denote the total number of the chaff epochs found in this way by C(t). Let CTR w (t) denote the resulting chaff-to-traffic ratio when we run BGM over (Wi)�=l until time t. Because run ning BGM over the whole measurements is the optimal partitioning to minimize the chaff portion, running BGM separately over the flow part and the chaff part will result more number of chaff epochs. In other words, the optimality ofBGM implies that C(t) is greater than or equal to C(t). In addition, since running BGM on (Fi)�=l results no chaff, C ( t) is the number of chaff epochs resulting from running BGM over (Wi)�=l until time t. Hence,
C(t) :S C(t) = N c (t)(CTR w (t)).
Dividing both sides by N(t) leads to
c (t) /t (CTR (t)). N(t) -N(t) w N(t)/t w
We have • Based on lemma 3.1, the following theorem guarantees the con sistency of DBD under independent Poisson chaff assumption. 
Moreover, the false alarm probability decays exponentially fast as the sample size grows.
Proof Fix p E (I� �� � � I , 1), and define 7 as given in the theo rem's statement. Then, p < e:p < 1. (i) Miss detection probability: Under 'HI, consider the case that CTR is no greater than p. If A f is the rate of the information flow,
.f , because CTR ::; p < 3 P: I < �. Then, lemma 3. 1 and the monotonicity of h give, under 'HI when CTR ::; p,
t-oo
Hence, if CTR ::; p, lim Pr(CTR(t) > T ) = 0, meaning the t-oo vanishing miss detection probability.
(ii) False alarm probability: Under 'Ho,
and theorem 6. 4 in (I] imply the exponential decay of the false alarm probability. Thus, DBD with the threshold T is p-consistent.
• For any p less than I, theorem 3.3 can give us a p-consistent detector if the chaff portions are independent Poisson processes. Fig. 2 shows the plots of CTR(t) with respect to the number of total epochs observed. Under 'HI, the fraction of chaff was set to be 0.95, meaning that 95 percent of epochs are chaff noise. Neverthless, we can see that CTR val ues of two hypotheses become completely separabl � s the sample size grows. The dashed straight line between two CTR plots is the threshold T given in theorem 3.3.
DETECTION OF PACKET FORWARDING
Problem Statement
This section deals with timing-based detection of packet forwarding. By observing 81 and 82 for some time t (t > 0), we want to test the following hypotheses.
'Ho: 81 and 82 are jointly independent 'HI: (81 , 82), (82, 8I ), or both contain an information flow The above is different from the problem in section 3. 1 in that RI and R2 are allowed to have flows in either or both directions under 'HI.
Packet-Forward-Detect
In this section, we propose a threshold-based detector referred to as Packet-Forward-Detect (PFD). PFD first calculates a lower bound CTR(t) of the true CTR(t). Then, it compares CTR(t) to a pre defined threshold T and makes a decision. PFD takes the following form,
Given (Si);=b CTR(t) is obtained by the below optimization. min fl 2, f;l ,Wi:
where Si = (f/ 2 EB fl I ) EB Wi rv 'HI stands for the constraint that (fP, f1 2 ) and (f:P, fl I ) are realizations of information flows with a delay bound �.
The above optimization can be achieved by a matching algo rithm called Bidirectional-Bounded-Greedy-Match (BiBGM). As the name stands, BiBGM can be understood as a bidirectional version of BGM. Given the measurements (Si);=b BiBGM works as follows: The implementation of PFD is given in Table I , and BiBGM is included in lines 1-12. Its computational complexity is O(ISI I + IS21). In addition, if an epoch is once labeled as chaff or matched to another, BiBGM no longer needs the epoch for processing newly incoming observations. Combined with the linear complexity, such characteristic makes PFD applicable on a real-time basis. To show the optimality of BiBGM, we introduce the following lemma regard ing the relation between BiBGM and BGM. 2. Apply BGM with the delay constraint 2� to the modified mea surements.
Proof Let 82 be a sequence generated by increasing every epoch in S2 by � (i. e. , 82(i) = 82(i) +�, 1 ::; i ::; IS21). The concrete steps of BiBGM are shown in table l. There, we can replace 82(n) with 82(n) -�, and rewrite the steps as follows.
l. m +-1, n +-1. I An ordered pair (x, y) is said to satisfY causality and the de lay con strainta if 0 < y -x < a. threshold'T of PFD satisfies 'T < 'To, then PFD is 'T-consistent. In addition, the false alarm probability decays exponenentially fast as the sample size grows.
For arbitrary chaff insertion, if the fraction of chaff is allowed to be greater than 'To, then BiBGM provides a way to schedule packet forwarding and chaff insertion to mimic 1to, thereby avoiding the detection. The following corollary guarantees the detectability under independent Poisson chaff assumption. Moreover, the false alarm probability decays exponentially fast as the sample size grows.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied timing-based detection of packet forward ing in MANETs. As a first step, we analyzed the performance of Detect-Bounded-Delay [1] under independent chaff assumption. Then, we proposed a packet forwarding detector and analyzed its perfor mance under various chaff assumption. Especially, when chaff por tions are independent Poisson processes, packet forwarding can be detected consistently regardless of its strength.
